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Add more recon infos
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stulle123
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@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ Install required tools:
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- Get [Burp Suite](https://portswigger.net/burp/communitydownload)
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- `$ brew install apktool nuclei radare2 sqlite db-browser-for-sqlite`
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- `$ pip3 install --upgrade frida-tools objection`
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- Install [Kakaotalk for Windows](https://app-pc.kakaocdn.net/talk/win32/KakaoTalk_Setup.exe) via [wine and brew](https://wiki.winehq.org/MacOS)
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### SSH
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40
RECON.md
40
RECON.md
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@ -17,7 +17,15 @@
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- [Malicious App](#malicious-third-party-app)
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- [Operator-side Attacks](#operator-side-attacks)
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## General infos
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## Related Work
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- [Kakaotalk Messaging Architecture](https://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1046438/FULLTEXT01.pdf#page=75)
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- [User Registration and Login](https://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1046438/FULLTEXT01.pdf#page=79)
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- [LOCO protocol](https://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1046438/FULLTEXT01.pdf#page=77)
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- [Protocol flaws](https://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1046438/FULLTEXT01.pdf#page=100)
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- [App security flaws](https://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1046438/FULLTEXT01.pdf#page=105)
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## General App Infos
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```
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Package name: com.kakao.talk
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@ -81,6 +89,8 @@ voiceMode.xml
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zzng.xml
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```
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Some values (e.g., OAuth tokens) in the Shared Preferences are encrypted with a static key which is derived from a hard-coded passphrase (can be found in class `SimpleCipher`).
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**TO-DO**: Check Shared Prefs for sensitive information.
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Trace Shared Prefs usage with this [Frida script](https://github.com/m0bilesecurity/Frida-Mobile-Scripts/blob/master/Android/shared_preferences_monitor.js). See [example trace](./recon/frida_trace_shared_prefs.log).
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@ -104,9 +114,9 @@ One can decrypt the contents of `KakaoTalk.db` and `KakaoTalk2.db` with this [sc
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## Rest APIs
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Java interfaces with interesting Rest APIs (interface names generated by `jadx`):
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Most endpoints are HTTPS protected. Certs in the `assets/sdk` folder are used for certification pinning (see class `com.kakao.i.http.g.b`).
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**TO-DO**: Add GET and POST requests. Use `sqlmap -r` to *fuzz* the Rest APIs.
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Java interfaces with interesting Rest APIs (interface names generated by `jadx`): **TO-DO**: Add GET and POST requests. Use `sqlmap -r` to *fuzz* the Rest APIs.
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Interesting classes:
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```
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@ -125,8 +135,12 @@ e31.ReAuthService
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p360hh.AuthApi
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```
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There are [Google API Keys](./recon/nuclei_keys_results.txt) which allow access to the Google Maps API. Unauthorized access might cost the company some money.
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## WebViews
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Cookies are encrypted with the hard-coded passphrase `KaKAOtalkForever`.
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**TO-DO**: Check for interesting [WebViews](./recon/nuclei_android_results.txt).
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## Intents
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@ -319,6 +333,8 @@ Version: 3
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### E2E
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E2E is opt-in only. Most people probably don’t use Secret Chat since `In a secret chatrooom, features including free calling, polls, events and chatroom album are currently not available`.
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Main implementation in package `com.kakao.talk.secret` and the `LocoCipherHelper ` class.
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## Possible Attack Vectors
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@ -326,11 +342,12 @@ Main implementation in package `com.kakao.talk.secret` and the `LocoCipherHelper
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### Registration and Login
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- Register an attacker's device to the victim's KakaoTalk account
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- Get victims account credentials (e.g., via a data dump on breached.vc)
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- Get victims account credentials email/pw (e.g., via a data dump on breached.vc)
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- Brute-force 4-digit pin
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- During registration a pincode is sent via SMS (intercept with SS7 access)
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- Register an attacker's device via flaws in the LOCO protocol (`CHECKIN` and `LOGINLIST` commands)
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- Check out insecure REST API endpoints
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- Intercept SMS during registration to get the pincode (e.g., via SS7 access)
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- Register an attacker's device via flaws in the LOCO protocol (`CHECKIN` and `LOGINLIST` commands?)
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- Check out insecure REST API endpoints for authorization flaws
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- Code injection into insecure REST API endpoints
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- QR Code login (`xm.a` and `vm.q` Java classes)
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- `/talk/account/qrCodeLogin/info.json?id=eyJwcm90b2NvbCI6InYxIiwiY2hhbGxlbmdlIjoiNlB6MFMzdkRQMmlFUTZoRXh5YW5mWGtOelNHU0RRIn0=`
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- `{"protocol":"v1","challenge":"6Pz0S3vDP2iEQ6hExyanfXkNzSGSDQ"}`
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@ -357,20 +374,25 @@ Main implementation in package `com.kakao.talk.secret` and the `LocoCipherHelper
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- [Owncloud CFB malleability bug](https://blog.hboeck.de/archives/880-Pwncloud-bad-crypto-in-the-Owncloud-encryption-module.html)
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- Use the `LOGINLIST` command with `chatDatas`, `attachment` or `code` JSON fields to run code on the client app?
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- Replay messages
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- Drop messages (maybe there's a way to fallback to unencrypted comms?)
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- Drop messages
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- Sniff plaintext LOCO packets (`CHECKIN` packet)
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- Downgrade attacks (maybe there's a way to fallback to unencrypted comms?)
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### Message Parsing ("Zero Click")
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- **TODO**: Build Kakaotalk Python app
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- Send a chat message to a victim to retrieve the E2E encryption key -> code injection
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- URL rendering
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- Calendar invite rendering
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- Emojis
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- Button rendering
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- Intents
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### Malicious third-party app
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- Install a malcious app on the victim's device to retrieve the E2E key via IPC
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- Send malicious intents (code injection)
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- Send malicious intents (code injection)
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- Spoof the Kakaotalk app
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### Operator-side Attacks
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