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Adding tarfile member sanitization to extractall() (#1709)
Fix a widespread bug named CVE-2007-4559, which is a 15 year old bug in the Python tarfile package. By using extract() or extractall() on a tarfile object without sanitizing input, a maliciously crafted .tar file could perform a directory path traversal attack. This patch essentially checks to see if all tarfile members will be extracted safely and throws an exception otherwise.
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@ -111,7 +111,26 @@ def unpack(tar_file, strip_prefix, dest_dir):
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
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with tarfile.open(tar_file) as tar:
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logger.debug(f"extract to {tmp}")
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tar.extractall(tmp)
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def is_within_directory(directory, target):
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abs_directory = os.path.abspath(directory)
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abs_target = os.path.abspath(target)
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prefix = os.path.commonprefix([abs_directory, abs_target])
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return prefix == abs_directory
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def safe_extract(tar, path=".", members=None, *, numeric_owner=False):
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for member in tar.getmembers():
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member_path = os.path.join(path, member.name)
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if not is_within_directory(path, member_path):
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raise Exception("Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File")
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tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner)
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safe_extract(tar, tmp)
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strip_prefix_dir = (
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pathlib.Path(tmp).joinpath(strip_prefix + os.path.sep).resolve()
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