mirror of
https://github.com/stulle123/kakaotalk_analysis.git
synced 2025-05-07 12:06:09 +00:00
Move sections
This commit is contained in:
stulle123
parent
b6236d8666
commit
73bd95d715
144
RECON.md
144
RECON.md
|
|
@ -1,5 +1,13 @@
|
||||||
# Recon
|
# Recon
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- [Related Work](#related-work)
|
||||||
|
- [Possible Vectors](#possible-attack-vectors)
|
||||||
|
- [Registration and Login](#registration-and-login)
|
||||||
|
- [Cloud](#cloud)
|
||||||
|
- [LOCO Protocol Attackss](#loco-protocol-attacks)
|
||||||
|
- [Message Parsing](#message-parsing-zero-click)
|
||||||
|
- [Malicious App](#malicious-third-party-app)
|
||||||
|
- [Operator-side Attacks](#operator-side-attacks)
|
||||||
- [General Infos](#general-infos)
|
- [General Infos](#general-infos)
|
||||||
- [Files](#files)
|
- [Files](#files)
|
||||||
- [Rest APIs](#rest-apis)
|
- [Rest APIs](#rest-apis)
|
||||||
|
|
@ -9,22 +17,81 @@
|
||||||
- [Open-Source Libs](#open-source-libs)
|
- [Open-Source Libs](#open-source-libs)
|
||||||
- [Crypto](#crypto)
|
- [Crypto](#crypto)
|
||||||
- [E2E](#e2e)
|
- [E2E](#e2e)
|
||||||
- [Possible Vectors](#possible-attack-vectors)
|
|
||||||
- [Registration and Login](#registration-and-login)
|
|
||||||
- [Cloud](#cloud)
|
|
||||||
- [LOCO Protocol Attackss](#loco-protocol-attacks)
|
|
||||||
- [Message Parsing](#message-parsing-zero-click)
|
|
||||||
- [Malicious App](#malicious-third-party-app)
|
|
||||||
- [Operator-side Attacks](#operator-side-attacks)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Related Work
|
## Related Work
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
How things work:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- [Kakaotalk Messaging Architecture](https://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1046438/FULLTEXT01.pdf#page=75)
|
- [Kakaotalk Messaging Architecture](https://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1046438/FULLTEXT01.pdf#page=75)
|
||||||
- [User Registration and Login](https://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1046438/FULLTEXT01.pdf#page=79)
|
- [User Registration and Login](https://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1046438/FULLTEXT01.pdf#page=79)
|
||||||
- [LOCO protocol](https://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1046438/FULLTEXT01.pdf#page=77)
|
- [LOCO protocol](https://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1046438/FULLTEXT01.pdf#page=77)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Flaws:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- [Protocol flaws](https://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1046438/FULLTEXT01.pdf#page=100)
|
- [Protocol flaws](https://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1046438/FULLTEXT01.pdf#page=100)
|
||||||
- [App security flaws](https://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1046438/FULLTEXT01.pdf#page=105)
|
- [App security flaws](https://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1046438/FULLTEXT01.pdf#page=105)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Possible Attack Vectors
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Registration and Login
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Register an attacker's device to the victim's KakaoTalk account
|
||||||
|
- Get victims account credentials email/pw (e.g., via a data dump on breached.vc)
|
||||||
|
- Brute-force 4-digit pin
|
||||||
|
- Intercept SMS during registration to get the pincode (e.g., via SS7 access)
|
||||||
|
- Register an attacker's device via flaws in the LOCO protocol (`CHECKIN` and `LOGINLIST` commands?)
|
||||||
|
- Check out insecure REST API endpoints for authorization flaws
|
||||||
|
- Code injection into insecure REST API endpoints
|
||||||
|
- QR Code login (`xm.a` and `vm.q` Java classes)
|
||||||
|
- `/talk/account/qrCodeLogin/info.json?id=eyJwcm90b2NvbCI6InYxIiwiY2hhbGxlbmdlIjoiNlB6MFMzdkRQMmlFUTZoRXh5YW5mWGtOelNHU0RRIn0=`
|
||||||
|
- `{"protocol":"v1","challenge":"6Pz0S3vDP2iEQ6hExyanfXkNzSGSDQ"}`
|
||||||
|
- `m.w.R1` method computes a MAC of the challenge
|
||||||
|
- The OAuth Refresh Token seems to be the MAC key
|
||||||
|
- How to obtain them? How are they generated? How long do they live?
|
||||||
|
- `ym.a` class builds the POST request
|
||||||
|
- API endpoints in interface `e31.j`
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Cloud
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Cloud back-up (weak password)
|
||||||
|
- Secret Chat messages won’t be stored
|
||||||
|
- Tamper with plaintext asset downloads via HTTP (parser attacks on the client possible?)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### LOCO Protocol Attacks
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Spoof victim (`CHECKIN` packet)
|
||||||
|
- Spoof victim’s device ID (**TODO**: How is it generated?)
|
||||||
|
- Spoof KakaoTalk server
|
||||||
|
- Send the attacker’s public key to the victim (maybe there’s a LOCO command for updating RSA public keys on the client?)
|
||||||
|
- MITM traffic
|
||||||
|
- Tamper messages (CFB malleability —> [Efail](https://jaads.de/Bachelorthesis/Bachelorthesis_Jan_Arends.pdf))
|
||||||
|
- [Owncloud CFB malleability bug](https://blog.hboeck.de/archives/880-Pwncloud-bad-crypto-in-the-Owncloud-encryption-module.html)
|
||||||
|
- Use the `LOGINLIST` command with `chatDatas`, `attachment` or `code` JSON fields to run code on the client app?
|
||||||
|
- Replay messages
|
||||||
|
- Drop messages
|
||||||
|
- Sniff plaintext LOCO packets (`CHECKIN` packet)
|
||||||
|
- Downgrade attacks (maybe there's a way to fallback to unencrypted comms?)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Message Parsing ("Zero Click")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **TODO**: Build Kakaotalk Python app
|
||||||
|
- Send a chat message to a victim to retrieve the E2E encryption key -> code injection
|
||||||
|
- URL rendering
|
||||||
|
- Calendar invite rendering
|
||||||
|
- Emojis
|
||||||
|
- Button rendering
|
||||||
|
- Intents
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Malicious third-party app
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Install a malcious app on the victim's device to retrieve the E2E key via IPC
|
||||||
|
- Send malicious intents (code injection)
|
||||||
|
- Spoof the Kakaotalk app
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Operator-side Attacks
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Operator-side MITM (e.g., by changing public keys)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## General App Infos
|
## General App Infos
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
```
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
@ -335,65 +402,4 @@ Version: 3
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
E2E is opt-in only. Most people probably don’t use Secret Chat since `In a secret chatrooom, features including free calling, polls, events and chatroom album are currently not available`.
|
E2E is opt-in only. Most people probably don’t use Secret Chat since `In a secret chatrooom, features including free calling, polls, events and chatroom album are currently not available`.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Main implementation in package `com.kakao.talk.secret` and the `LocoCipherHelper ` class.
|
Main implementation in package `com.kakao.talk.secret` and the `LocoCipherHelper ` class.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Possible Attack Vectors
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Registration and Login
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- Register an attacker's device to the victim's KakaoTalk account
|
|
||||||
- Get victims account credentials email/pw (e.g., via a data dump on breached.vc)
|
|
||||||
- Brute-force 4-digit pin
|
|
||||||
- Intercept SMS during registration to get the pincode (e.g., via SS7 access)
|
|
||||||
- Register an attacker's device via flaws in the LOCO protocol (`CHECKIN` and `LOGINLIST` commands?)
|
|
||||||
- Check out insecure REST API endpoints for authorization flaws
|
|
||||||
- Code injection into insecure REST API endpoints
|
|
||||||
- QR Code login (`xm.a` and `vm.q` Java classes)
|
|
||||||
- `/talk/account/qrCodeLogin/info.json?id=eyJwcm90b2NvbCI6InYxIiwiY2hhbGxlbmdlIjoiNlB6MFMzdkRQMmlFUTZoRXh5YW5mWGtOelNHU0RRIn0=`
|
|
||||||
- `{"protocol":"v1","challenge":"6Pz0S3vDP2iEQ6hExyanfXkNzSGSDQ"}`
|
|
||||||
- `m.w.R1` method computes a MAC of the challenge
|
|
||||||
- The OAuth Refresh Token seems to be the MAC key
|
|
||||||
- How to obtain them? How are they generated? How long do they live?
|
|
||||||
- `ym.a` class builds the POST request
|
|
||||||
- API endpoints in interface `e31.j`
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Cloud
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- Cloud back-up (weak password)
|
|
||||||
- Secret Chat messages won’t be stored
|
|
||||||
- Tamper with plaintext asset downloads via HTTP (parser attacks on the client possible?)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### LOCO Protocol Attacks
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- Spoof victim (`CHECKIN` packet)
|
|
||||||
- Spoof victim’s device ID (**TODO**: How is it generated?)
|
|
||||||
- Spoof KakaoTalk server
|
|
||||||
- Send the attacker’s public key to the victim (maybe there’s a LOCO command for updating RSA public keys on the client?)
|
|
||||||
- MITM traffic
|
|
||||||
- Tamper messages (CFB malleability —> [Efail](https://jaads.de/Bachelorthesis/Bachelorthesis_Jan_Arends.pdf))
|
|
||||||
- [Owncloud CFB malleability bug](https://blog.hboeck.de/archives/880-Pwncloud-bad-crypto-in-the-Owncloud-encryption-module.html)
|
|
||||||
- Use the `LOGINLIST` command with `chatDatas`, `attachment` or `code` JSON fields to run code on the client app?
|
|
||||||
- Replay messages
|
|
||||||
- Drop messages
|
|
||||||
- Sniff plaintext LOCO packets (`CHECKIN` packet)
|
|
||||||
- Downgrade attacks (maybe there's a way to fallback to unencrypted comms?)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Message Parsing ("Zero Click")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- **TODO**: Build Kakaotalk Python app
|
|
||||||
- Send a chat message to a victim to retrieve the E2E encryption key -> code injection
|
|
||||||
- URL rendering
|
|
||||||
- Calendar invite rendering
|
|
||||||
- Emojis
|
|
||||||
- Button rendering
|
|
||||||
- Intents
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Malicious third-party app
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- Install a malcious app on the victim's device to retrieve the E2E key via IPC
|
|
||||||
- Send malicious intents (code injection)
|
|
||||||
- Spoof the Kakaotalk app
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Operator-side Attacks
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- Operator-side MITM (e.g., by changing public keys)
|
|
||||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user